1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the methods and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity. 2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment. 4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury. 5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment. 7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death. 8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment. 9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible. 10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgement required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
BEESON:
We are glad to have Professor Donnelly and Professor Smith help us with a discussion of moral issues involved in clinical investigation. The four panel members met last week for an initial consideration of the areas we might hope to attack in a short space of time. I have been given the job of mentioning some of these.
Clinical investigation, of course, is the study of disease in man, and has as its purpose improvement in medical practice. This goal is widely endorsed and considered good by everyone. It has great popular support, as evidenced by the large sums of governmental money that are devoted to it, as well as the subscriptions to private organizations which also deal with medical research. For obvious reasons, clinical investigation must be done by physicians. This is one of the troublesome points our panel has to deal with. The fact that clinical research involves the conduct of experiments on human beings, and therefore affects the unique relationship of trust between the patient and physician, is one of the serious obstacles to be faced. The idea that a physician experiments on his patients is a somewhat repugnant and unfamiliar concept. Well, if that be so, can we do without it? We think not. If we are going to strive for better methods of medical practice it must be accepted that experiments will be performed on human beings. There must be a first time that a new drug is tried on man; there must be a first time that a new operative procedure is carried out. These are kinds of clinical investigation. It could be argued, in fact, that every doctor in the course of his daily practice engages in the conduct of experiments with his patients. Most of these experiments are related to devising better methods of treatment and consequently they are comparatively easy to justify. But there is, of course, the kind of clinical investigation which is more in the realm of pure scientific endeavor where one is endeavoring to obtain information by study of normal individuals or persons with diseases, where the information obtained is not likely to be of immediate value to the subject of the experiment. Now here we have the nub of our question, in that we are dealing with the propriety and the morals of the conduct of scientific experiments by physicians on human beings. We felt that in the limited discussion we can have here it would be a good idea to focus, so to speak, on the nakedest kind of clinical investigation: the scientific experiment which is not likely to result in direct benefit to the subject of that experiment. There is a notable absence of this sort of discussion in medical writings. I think the reason we see this meeting so well attended today is that we are touching on a worrisome and sensitive topic. There is nothing said about experimentation by the physician in the Hippocratic Oath or in later codes of ethics that have been written by various medical organizations. It is a topic that people tend to shy away from. The same holds true in regard to its legal aspects, and Professor Donnelly will doubtless have more to say about this.
We did plan to take off in this discussion along the lines of the legality of it and for that reason we have distributed in the audience copies of the statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal. We would like to begin with the first article, which is perhaps the most important, because it has to do with the obtaining of consent from the subject of the experiment and of informing him as to the nature of the experiment. Professor Donnelly, would you like to start? DONNELLY: Before taking off on the principle, I would like to make a preliminary statement. The law in determining the legality of professional behavior will, except for a very few exceptions, look to the ethical codes and institutionalized practices of the profession involved. Now this is what happened in the war crimes trial involving the medical profession. It was anticipated before the trial actually began that one of the chief defenses of the doctors being prosecuted would be that they were engaged in legitimate human experimentation and clinical research. As far as I was able to find out this was the first time this defense has ever been squarely presented to a court of law. Anticipating this defense, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War requested the American Medical Association to appoint a group to attempt to formulate standards for this kind of experi-mentation. As a result of that request, Dr. Andrew Ivy was appointed as Chief Consultant to the attorneys charged with the prosecution of the defendants. He was asked to prepare a code of ethics to be followed in using human subjects for medical research. As a result of that request the ten principles you have before you were developed and, with very minor modification, were presented to the court by General Taylor who prosecuted the case for the Allied Nations. All ten of these principles were accepted and adopted by the court. This, as I said before, is the first and only legal case where this particular issue has been specifically involved. I think it is also interesting to note that this particular war crimes prosecution was brought in the name of the United States on behalf of the allies. The chief prosecutor was General Taylor. The three judges who sat on the case and adopted these principles were three very prominent chief justices of state supreme courts in the United States. Now if this matter would come up again, and it probably will, this particular judgement would not be conclusive or binding upon courts in this country or elsewhere. On the other hand, I think it would have a tremendous influence, and it is very likely these principles would be adopted in toto or perhaps with modifications suggested by experts in this particular field. So the point I really want to make is that the law really looks outside of itself in dealing with matters it is not familiar with. The real issue, I think, from a legal point of view, is what questions would a lawyer raise in regard to these principles because there are many matters of interpretation presented. I don't know if you want me to continue with the questions I would raise with regard to No. 1 or refer to someone else on this panel.
Well, why don't you go ahead and discuss Article Number One? I think that Dr. Bondy and I would raise a lot of questions about whether any kind of clinical investigation could proceed if strictly interpreted along the lines of these proposals.
DONNELLY:
Well, I feel that is true too. Some of the questions I would raise on the matter of consent are, first of all, are there or should there be some types of experiments or research that a person is incapable of consenting to on moral grounds assuming that he is competent legally? Shouldn't there be some limitation on what he could consent to? Secondly, I think this first principle is rather vague in its use of the phraseology, "legal capacity to give consent." Would this preclude research in the field of mental illness or when minors are the subjects of the experimentation? And then it uses the expression, "without the intervention of fraud, etc. duress, overreaching." Would this exclude the use of prisoners as subjects or other groups of deprived persons? As to the requirement of "disclosure,"-would it prevent the use of placebos in investigations? And finally, regarding the expression of "hazards reasonably to be expected." Is that a legitimate and proper restriction upon experimentation? I think those would be the preliminary questions I would raise. SMITH:
Well, I don't know if I would carry along in this line at the moment, but it does seem to me necessary to mention a few ground rules with regard to the discussion of what one might call, say, moral issues. Sometimes this expression is frightening and I suppose since I am the consulting moralist on this panel I ought to put you at ease. Let us use the expression "moral issue" in the broad enough sense to make it workable in a discussion of this kind, to mean that a moral issue would be involved whenever we seek to evaluate our practice and make decisions. I think basically these are the two circumstances in which moral questions will arise: first, when some practice which already exists is being evaluated by us as to whether it is a valid procedure, whether it is something we want to continue to engage in, whether we are justified to continue to engage in it, and second, in having to make decisions in regard to the future action and policy. Now for myself, I would find a moral issue involved where there is some matter of principle or end or goal or value. In the case before us the presence of persons in the experimental situation is what raises a fundamental question. That is, presumably we would not find ourselves raising the same question about some of the experimentations in which some of the physicists engage in-the atoms at least don't talk back. Now, when it comes to evaluations there is the matter not only of the evaluation of goals, that is to say, specifying what aims or aim is in view and attempting to justify that, but also the matter of means, which is sometimes forgotten. There is a morality of means as well as of ends. For example, if Dr. Donnelly will allow this, even the law acknowledges that there may be illegitimate means for gaining information, certain information which is to serve as evidence such that as evidence it would be admissible, but the means used to obtain it would not necessarily be regarded as legitimate. So there is the problem of ways and means as well as ends, and I think one of the fundamental aspects of this whole discussion is that the methods employed, though they may appear quite neutral from a technical standpoint, may very well involve rather complex moral questions, as I think is fairly obvious in the case before us. Now in any concrete situation one has to try to specify the values involved and attempt to locate situations where conflicting values exist, and I would suppose in our present situation we find ourselves right in that spot. That is to say, one of the conditions laid down in the Nuremberg statement is that the degree of risk should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem. As you well know, one should easily determine what the importance of the given line of investigation is, and then the results if achieved in a certain direction would be in relation to the risks involved. But I would regard that as a case where you may have a conflict of value and when you have that these are the hardest cases to decide. But at all events, I should insist-I was bothered and perhaps some of you were too-in the reports of the Eichmann trial as to how frequently the euthanasia problem was referred to by the attorneys as a purely medical affair. As far as I am concerned I would dissent from the whole idea that the disposition of the human person shall ever ultimately be a purely medical affair. There will be other considerations not only with regard to the internal ethics of the profession, but with regard to the status of medicine and medical research within the total culture. Now for a final comment for the moment; for the purpose perhaps of focusing a further discussion, I think one can take the bull by the horns with regard to even this difficult issue and put it this way: either we are prepared to say that all experimentation is to be avoided, a proposition which I myself would find very hard to justify in absolute terms, or there must be constraining and restraining conditions in accordance with which all experimentation would take place, and it seems to me there are no further alternatives before us than these, although the working out of the second is a matter of great difficulty.
BONDY:
I should like to address myself to this also. It seems to me that the problem we are up against as physicians is to define "consent" of the experimental subject. To a considerable extent the limitations Professor Smith has mentioned would be obvious I think, and probably self imposed within the experiment if the subject were as capable of judging the experiment as the experimentor is. There is a very interesting phrase in Item 5, which says that no experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur except perhaps in those experiments where the experimental physician will also serve as subject. The presumption is that the experimental physician will take pretty good care to see to it that there really isn't much risk of death or disabling injury. The problem is how you can get voluntary consent from untrained subjects under the limitations which this statement establishes. We have a moral obligation to reveal the extent and risks of the experiment. This obligation may be difficult to fulfill because of the subject's technical or intellectual limitations. Moreover, in addition to the moral obligation we must protect our human subjects even from risks they may acquiesce to.
An additional obligation which is not obvious but must be stated is to do a worthwhile experiment. I don't mean merely that the question asked should be worthwhile, but that the experiment should be so designed that there is a very good chance that the information obtained will be meaningful and will forward the progress of knowledge. It is immoral to ask a human being to subject himself to any kind of a risk (and every experiment we do carries some kind of risk) unless the experiment is designed to give a proper intellectual reward. But this raises the problem of how you can design such an experiment while the patient or subject is fully cognizant of what you intend to do. The obvious situations which come to mind immediately are those having to do with psychological or psychiatric subjects where it is very important that the patient not be clearly informed of what is going on. You want him to react in an uninformed fashion because as soon as you tell him what you are doing the experiment is changed. The question raised by Professor Donnelly on the use of placebos is clearly a comparable one.
Another problem in obtaining informed consent is that a procedure which carries a low risk, if described to a layman who has never seen or heard of such things, is likely to appear a procedure of high risk. For example, cardiac catheterization carries only a very small risk; but if a patient lies on a table and tries to visualize exactly where the long tube is going as it traverses his body, he is likely to get quite upset. The question is whether you can do a good experiment and obtain basic data necessary for your purposes if the patient lies on the table figuratively chewing his fingernails and literally shooting epinephrine out into his system. These practical problems have to be solved if we are going to be able to do medical experimentation. I don't believe the first statement in the Nuremberg principles permits appropriate handling of these questions. To a considerable extent it seems to me that the responsibility here must lie with the experimentor or with some governing body which will supervise the experimentor. Most Well, gentlemen, even if we were to agree, as I think I would, that if one took the first extended proposition and tried to apply it quite precisely, exactly, and literally with a minimum of ambiguity and application, then I think it would eliminate an effective practice. But I wonder if this isn't the case with regard to any code, and that one of the things one has to see is that without a set of boundary conditions the situation might very well turn out to be much less satisfactory than it would be with one, even though one could not fulfill these to the letter of the law. I think you and I, (or perhaps I shouldn't implicate you) let me say I think I can find some fairly respectable reasons why each of these conditions is laid down.
Oh yes, I agree. As you read this for the first time it sounds like a perfectly logical and reasonable code to follow. And in fact, my first reaction on reading this is to say that I would be upset if I thought I would ever break such a code. However, to be perfectly honest, I have done some things which did not follow the letter of the code. It is as I think about this, that I begin to worry about where the limits should be. Let me ask you a question in another direction. It is all very well to say that you have a code which lays out the ideal practice. This is easy to set up in many situations. But where do you stop once you have started breaking the code? Is it useful to have a code which is unrealistic? some justification for what one does such that we can remove ourselves from the sense that we are acting in a wholly haphazard way, in a wholly unjustified way, acting in a way to which there is neither reason nor right. Now, it is unfair to attempt to answer a hard question by putting up another question. Let me try to answer the first question. You see, from my standpoint, and I am afraid I will lose my post now as consulting moralist-my approach to problems of this kind is that unless one has some conditions which in the end are incapable of being exactly adhered to, that you really have nothing to give you a bad conscience. And to overcome the possibility of misuse, you see, one of the things that happens in cases where human freedom is involved is that invariably we try to justify whatever practice we think is technically demanding by showing that we are doing it for a good end. I mean, that is both the best defense and the last refuge of a scoundrel. One must not overlook both possibilities. Where you have a human being who can talk back, who at least from some of the things I read and from the July orations and even commencement speeches, a human being who is supposed to be distinguished from a thing, and distingttished from a thing in part because of certain rights which he bears and certain values which he has, you also have the possibility of misuse of freedom. Now again you can say as you did before, that you like to have a rational code, etc., which is quite logical as long as that is not a prelude to calling it irrelevant. I would want to say that without it you haven't got much way of restraining the possibility of misuse of freedom. I am very much concerned about that side of the matter insofar as there is a moral issue in this at all-the possibility of the misuse of freedom when we are dealing with human persons. So I come back to this again. On the one hand, I agree with you that this statement is not realistic in a certain sense, as it seems to bypass the harder questions. On the other hand, it allows us to evaluate the situation better when we have a document which clearly is intended to protect the rights of persons, especially in a situation, and it is not so long ago when the rights of persons were very vigorously violated. In order to make that statement one has to have some grounds to complain, and on what ground will you complain except that you have some ideal which judges the practice in which you are actually engaged.
BEESON:
I think we must read the Nuremberg Code in reference to the conditions under which it was written. This is a wonderful document to say why the war crimes were atrocities, but it is not a very good guide to clinical investigation which is done with high motives.
DONNELLY:
Well, I would certainly agree with that. Again I am troubled by the point that Dr. Smith raised. What is the role of the law in situations like this? Is it merely to set out and specify broad ethical guide lines, or should it try to intervene and deal with specific instances? I am inclined to think that the legal forum is not the proper place to deal with these issues in detail. I do think it should try to enunciate broad ethical principles which should govern experimentation on human beings. Now how should the details be worked out? One of the ways which appeals to me would be through the medical profession itself, through institutional organizations that exercise control over various experimentors. Any qualified person who conforms to the standards enunciated by these professional groups should be immunized from legal liability, except in the most far-reaching cases.
BONDY:
But the only trouble is that the German doctors who were on trial were initially men who could qualify by your standards, and the experiments they started out to do may have been reasonable, at least at first. The trouble is not that they didn't start out with defensible standards, but that they made exceptions; and soon found themselves in a moral vacuum in which each experimentor pushed as far as he could justify himself. This is the thing that is worrying me. I am not quarreling with your idea of an ideal. I think this is fine, but we have to make specific day to day decisions, and the question is how far can you go from the ideal before you begin to worry. It is entirely a matter of conscience as far as I can see. Each person's conscience will probably be a little different and there are some people who will be inclined to go quite a long way while other people will be inclined to stick very close to the letter. I can think of one physician who refused, for example, to get involved in a certain kind of human experiment which I myself would have considered perfectly legitimate. Since he was unwilling to study humans, he worked on animals. I don't want to get into the argument about vivisection, but there are people who would say that this is not a fair choice either. The animals certainly cannot give you consent.
BEESON:
As everybody knows there are far better laws for protecting animals than for protecting people in this business. I think in regard to the conscience of the physician, etc., one of the eroding things that does affect us is that physicians are accustomed to the fact that everything they do has a risk; every treatment has a potentiality for harming the patient; consequently the physician is constantly making a judgement whether a thing is more likely to help than to hinder. As a matter of fact we simply could not treat patients if we told them in advance every toxic effect of the treatment or diagnostic procedure we contemplated using in their case. We have to make that decision and we rely on the patient's trust and the fact that he cannot put himself in our place, and we make this decision. So we come to the business of clinical investigation and measure the risk; and the risk may be in our minds small, yet if we were to tell a person of all the possible things that could go wrong in the course of the experiment he probably would not wish to submit to it. This despite the fact, and I think this ought to be pointed out, that it is surprising how willing people are to submit to clinical experiments, to having tests made upon themselves, even when they realize these are tests which are made purely for knowledge and not with the idea of benefiting them directly. SMITH:
May I just ask this question? When you speak about "purely for knowledge and not for the purpose of benefiting them directly," do you mean to imply that there would be no consideration at all as to whether anybody is benefited? I take it you don't mean that.
Oh, no, I think we all assume that all knowledge is likely to be useful, but it is very difficult to say at the time it is gained what its ultimate significance will be. We are trying to build a foundation of clinical science on which better practice can evolve. We can certainly look back over the past couple of decades and see areas where the findings of pure, nontherapeutic clinical investigation have enormously improved our management of such things as heart disease or kidney disease and have really revolutionized certain areas of surgery.
46S SMITH:
In other words, you would regard medical knowledge as being, if you want, practically oriented. That is to say, in physics or mathematics it is possible, for example, to put the puzzle as any number the sum of four squares. That is a respectable puzzle and as a matter of fact, it has been answered, but we would give a fellow a grant for doing that and we wouldn't pay any attention to whether it would be possible to build a transistor with the answer. It might turn out that somebody will stumble across this and do that, but that is not part of the original intention. Now in regard to physics, I think it is a similar matter. One might say, look, what is the ultimate constitution of matter? Are there eleven particles or twelve? This then can be a subject for research such that once again we might be inclined to say, well, perhaps we can do something with the results but it was no part or proper part of the intention of the enterprise that somebody will have this engineering consequence. But now, is medicine ever in the same position? This is not a rhetorical question, which means that I know the answer, but I really would like to hear in the context of our discussion whether you think it would be appropriate for somebody to come along and say we are going to make certain investigations, let's say with regard to this individual here before us, that is absolutely the same case as the problem of the sum of four squares and the number of ultimate particles; or would it always be presumed that there was some kind of a context in which there was some disease ultimately leading to treatment as a result of the experiment? You must have that boundary condition in the back of your mind. Is not medical knowledge, even at its purest, always called practical; or have the doctors also been bitten by the bug of useless knowledge? BONDY: I am very much interested in "useless" knowledge but it is difficult for me to think of any experiment you could do on a human being that couldn't in some way pertain ultimately to an improvement of our understanding about human function and, therefore, presumably to how to make sick patients healthy. As I say, I can't visualize an absolutely "pure" experiment. The closest thing I can think of off hand, for example, is an attempt to find out whether the genetic code which is known to work on bacteria would also work on humans; but even here the ultimate hope might be that some day you could manipulate the genes and in this way cure genetic disease. In the long run there might still be a practical value to such research. I should like to come back to something we discussed earlier which bothers me a lot. That is the double role which the clinical investigator plays as both the physician and the scientist. This is a very touchy point because most of the experimental subjects come into your hands because they are patients. Occasionally they may become available because you ask for volunteers from a prison or a Boy Scout Troop, but even there you have a special rapport which hinges on the fact that you are a physician. The attitude of a subject toward you is strongly conditioned by the fact that you are a doctor of medicine. This frequently produces a conflict because the experiment very often requires manipulations that are not properly in line with what a physician does. The object is not to improve people but to learn from them. I might cite some experiments carried out in this country in which prisoners agreed to be inoculated with the agents of typhoid fever and malaria. This is just the opposite of a physician's usual practice. The objectives of these experiments are excellent, but the experiments themselves are anti-medical. They are useful; they may be justified; but the physician who is in charge of these experiments is in a very difficult position.
BEESON:
The reasons for conducting such experiments are persuasive. Typhoid fever, for example, is a disease that occurs only in man; there is no animal counterpart for it. We need a better vaccine against typhoid fever. These people think and feel that the slight risk they incur in producing the disease, under the best possible conditions and with a curative therapy always at hand, is worth while when balanced against great value of a better vaccine. The same goes for malaria, which is one of the major diseases of the world at the present time. A curative therapy is available and it was felt justifiable to induce malaria in certain individuals.
DONNELLY:
Well, I would like to make just one or two comments. Even though it were possible to develop a defense from a legal point of view in regard to an experiment, is it really desirable to deprive a person who may have been injured from any compensation? Given the fact that most medical research, as I understand it, is being conducted by government and various institutions and organizations, shouldn't there be something equivalent to Workmen's Compensation or some sort of insurance program so that in the event anyone were injured in any way he would be compensated for that injury? I dislike to approve a defense in this area which would com-pletely exonerate the investigator although he might not have been at fault. To place the loss upon the person who has volunteered for an experiment which is of great value to society as a whole and to deprive him of any sort of relief or compensation offends me. BEESON:
Along that line perhaps you can tell us whether you think the practical item of malpractice insurance would protect a doctor from a suit which was based on a piece of clinical investigation. DONNELLY:
Well, that raises a very complicated question which I don't think I am really competent to answer. I think one of the real dangers here is getting the whole malpractice problem involved in clinical research or medical experimentation. I think on the whole they are two separate problems. The malpractice cases that come up are usually based upon the theory that the physician departed from well recognized and established practices. It is not a question of experimentation but of a failure to conform. I think that experimentation should be recognized as a separate and distinct matter and, if the investigator complies with the standards that have been set up by responsible groups for conduct of experimentation, he should be protected. I would think that some kind of an insurance program, either public or private, could be devised to provide him with adequate protection and at the same time adequately compensate the subject. SMITH:
I would want to defend you on the point that the sharp distinction between experiments and treatment is probably a mistake. One must understand what is actually happening; to see that every move which is made in the process of treatment involves some kind of risk, and is in a rudimentary sense, an experiment. Let me see if I can briefly offer an analogy from another sphere -education for example. Students generally feel that we have some timeless and spaceless place in which we work out all the principles and having gotten them worked out we apply them to the educational process so that at any given point no experimenting is going on. When experimenting is going on, or should be all the time; the student, if you want, is a guinea pig. Now I think applying it over here (I am sure in the popular imagination these two things are quite separated)-if we were to break down the sharp distinction between experiment and treatment where one is supposed to involve the application of safe secure knowledge, established practice, etc., and the other which is supposed to be moving into the absolutely unknown -if one were to narrow the gap and not make an absolute dichotomy between those two, then I think it would be a little more understandable that risk is involved perhaps to a lesser extent all the way along the line. When we make explicit that experimentation in this sense, now the fully explicit sense to which we understand it, means an intensification of something which is already going on, and not the introduction of something which is absolutely new, then the risk does not seem so immense.
BONDY:
Except for one thing and that is what I alluded to in the beginning, namely, that the experiment in the sense we are talking about is a designed attempt to obtain knowledge. What happens in the practice of medicine is usually undesigned and rather haphazard. In the course of designing the attempt to gain knowledge you introduce risk to people who would not be at risk under the course of treatment-the controls, if you like, or the normals. This is the place, it seems to me, where you might have difficulty if somebody criticized you, not for malpractice, but for assault. In fact, I would like to ask whether a man can give consent to be assaulted? If you do something which damages him even though he said you could, can he revoke his consent? DONNELLY: Well, I had that in mind in my introductory remarks when I said that there are certain overriding ethical and moral considerations that the law itself imposes. There are certain crimes that one can't consent to. Euthanasia murder, for example, or abortion in a non-therapeutic sense. The law feels that this particular activity is one that society condemns to the degree that the individual has no power to consent to it. The same is true of an aggravated assault. BEFESON:
I am going to call on Dr. J. W. Hollingsworth, who is Chairman of the Committee on Clinical Investigation in this Medical Center. I wonder if you would like to say something about the procedures that are standard here.
HOLLINGSWORTH:
Recognizing some of these problems you have heard about, the Dean, I think five or six years ago, set up the Committee on Clinical Investigation. We have so far limited our activities to these areas in which people are being used as subjects, and not in which they are having potentially direct therapeutic benefits from some procedure. We ask that members of the faculty submit a fairly brief protocol to this Committee and let us look it over to be sure that it complies in general with the sort of principles which are enunciated, I think, in the Nuremberg Document, although we have used no specifics in this. In general is it a safe experiment, is it likely to show something? It certainly is not an absolute safeguard against something happening in clinical investigation, but I think that perhaps we have managed to slow down, and I think Professor Smith's comments about constraining and restraining influence has been what we have been. We have made people stop and get together a protocol and wait a couple of weeks for an answer. We have made investigators to some extent stop and think whether they really want to get the piece of information enough to go through this modest amount of rigmarole. We have not gone beyond this into the area of direct therapeutics although we do expect to have a panel available to help a physician decide whether a new drug is worth clinical testing and whether the preclinical pharmacology has been properly done, etc.
BEESON:
Dean Lippard,* would you care to make any comments?
LIPPARD: I would like to emphasize two points. One thing that Dr. Beeson said: whenever a physician treats a patient he is taking a calculated risk. I think it is safe to say there is nothing that is therapeutically successful which does not entail a risk. The risk may be one in a million or it may be one in two. When you assume the responsibility of a physician you are supposed to know how far you are going in that gamble so that we are all experimenting every day. The other point that seems to me is important is that there is distinction between some deliberate experimentation and casual experimentation which takes place along with very well recognized diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Our interest and our concern has been directed largely toward what Dr. Hollingsworth said. Those that are more deliberate in nature in which you take a normal person or a person who is not likely to be benefited in any way by the procedure you are planning to carry out in order that an answer may be obtained to a question considered to be important because of the results it may bring about in desired diagnostic value or therapeutic results. Now one point which hasn't been made is that there is a lot of good clinical investigation going on every day which entails almost no danger to the patient. That is to say, nature has established experiments for us. When a patient comes in with loss of function of most of his thyroid, there is an experiment beautifully set up in which observations can be made with no likelihood of doing the patient any harm. The harm has been done by nature and you are taking advantage of a natural experiment set up for you. This constitutes, I would be willing to bet, 90 or 95 per cent of the clinical investigation which goes on. It really has been quite surprising how infrequently Dr. Hollingsworth's committee has been called upon to pass judgement on the more deliberate type of experiment.
BONDY:
It should be recognized that even passive observation can entail risk, though. Suppose that all you were going to do was follow the patient until he gets better, but you keep him in the hospital an extra few weeks while you do this and he gets a staphylococcal infection which he is much more likely to get in the hospital than at home. Another problem is: although nature has made the experiment, nature has not necessarily made it easy to do the observations which are most meaningful. For example, some papers were published recently on cardiopulmonary function in patients with hypothyroidism. The hypothyroidism was provided by the Lord but the catheters which were passed and the breathing tests, etc., were imposed on the patient by the physician. Without them we would not have gained much extra knowledge. So I don't think that the experiments of nature, however valuable they may be, really answer any part of this question. We still are up against the same fundamental problem. I should like to comment briefly about the question about research institutes, including our own research ward. People will often consent to be experimental subjects for a reward. The reward in this instance is free medical care, which often can save them a great deal of money. Prisoners may consent because they believe, in spite of being informed to the contrary, that being experimental subjects may shorten their sentences, or improve their chances of parole. The one important reservation is that when a patient or subject has volunteered under these circumstances he should not be coerced into continuing the experiment if he decides on further experience that he wants to quit. Of course, he can sign out of the hospital or institute if he doesn't like what we are doing to him. In one sense, therefore, consent is implied when a person goes to an experimental unit. He wouldn't go there if he didn't expect to be experimented on. Moreover, he must sign a very specific consent form before being admitted. On the other hand, I don't think that just because he is there the experimentor should consider him private property until the experiment is completed.
DONNELLY:
This issue of implied consent comes up chiefly I think in malpractice cases where a person consents to one operation and the operation is performed. It is then found that something else is involved that is dangerous and should be removed at the time. I think the doctor has implied consent to do that. My guess would be that this more frequently arises in the cases of physician-patient relations than in the investigator-subject relationship. Another point I would like to raise is this. If you look at Number 9 of the Nuremberg principles, it is stated that during the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end. I am asking this as a matter of information, are there not certain types of experimentation where the sudden interruption of it on the patient's decision alone would be the equivalent of a death sentence? In such a case would the investigator be liable if he continued the administration of a drug to an experimentally infected subject? I am curious about that particular provision of these Nuremberg principles.
BONDY:
You mean, suppose a patient who had been infected with typhoid fever wanted to bow out and therefore not get Chloromycetin? I guess he would get it anyhow if he had typhoid.
DONNELLY:
Would that then create liability on the part of the investigator under these principles? I don't think it would. SMITH:
I think that Number 1 has something to say about that, namely, the idea that the consent has to be bound by certain conditions insofar as the individual can be provided with some knowledge. The difficulty of making consent absolutely precise, which we will all agree to, doesn't follow from that because it doesn't mean anything at all. It is once again a matter of trying to make more precise these boundary conditions. In the very first proposition there is reference to understanding and decision. Now again it is certainly the case that the layman is not going to be in the position to evaluate all he is told. On the other hand, there should be, I think from the other side, the awareness of some responsibilty to try to, let us say, show the layman what he is in for. And I don't think this is special in this area. I think in every area where there is a technical language and technical knowledge that has something to do with a layman you have that problem. I think that lawyers have this problem too as to whether laymen know what a naught is and things like that when he is asked to put himself in the hands of the legal advisor. BEESON: Well, in answer to the earlier question, a simple answer is no. I don't think anybody says that it is all right to go ahead without consent, even though other proprieties may have been satisfied. The troubling thing is whether the patient is capable of really understanding and of giving an informed consent, and the fact is that he is not. The physician experimentor has to have the integrity and do the best he can to lay out a fair case, but with the understanding that the patient does not appreciate exactly what is going on or what will be done. As I said earlier, there probably are times when the experimentor realizes he can't spell out in detail all the things that might happen any more than the physician who is about to do an appendectomy could spell out to the patient all the complications that could arise from an appendectomy. The operation wouldn't be done.
Audience Question:
I would like to ask about the legal and philosophic aspects of consent.
There are two problems here. I think No. 1 of the Nuremberg principles raises a serious question as to the use of placebos since complete disclosure is required. Another question is whom do you get consent from? Take children. As I understand the polio experiment, there was some risk not only that the child who was given the injection might be harmed, but that neighborhood children might also get the disease. Now do you go around the neighborhood and require consent from the parents of those children? As I recall it, it was decided not to. As far as the children who were given the injection were concerned, it was felt there was a potential benefit to the child. This notion of benefit enters into the picture whenever you are dealing with children or with mentally ill people. If the subject is likely to benefit either presently or potentially from the experiment, then parental consent or guardian consent is deemed sufficient. Again I point out this has not been litigated to my knowledge in any detail. SMITH:
With regard to No. 5 since you singled it out, I would regard that as one of the more unrealistic statements of the list with the expression "a priori reason" being entirely too strong there. I take it that they take the qualification a priori to indicate that there would be some certainty about it, and I think it is fairly obvious with regard to any situation where you have actual conditions present that what you might think to be certain of in advance would be very minimal. You would have to put this in terms of probability. You might say that if three people were standing in a row you would know before the fact that one of them would be between the other two, but that is a model of the kind of thing that could be said to be a priori so it would have to be put in terms of probability. From my standpoint it is entirely too strong.
I would agree with that. Also going back to No. 1 as to the nature of the disclosure. The second line from the bottom provides that "all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected must be disclosed." I would question "reasonably to be expected," particularly when you are dealing with an initial experiment. I think that as a lawyer I would be inclined to substitute probable hazards, speaking in terms of probability rather than reasonableness.
In answer to Dr. Bondy's suggestion that we have a more realistic code than the one at the Nuremberg trial, you responded that it is more effective to have an approach beyond the reach of practicality rather than be satisfied every day. Then Dr. Bondy mentioned conscience as a principal factor which controlled the position of his obligations. Do you feel the only way a physician can be restrained by his conscience with respect to moral issues is by finding himself in a position where he is subjected to a feeling of guilt as a result of not satisfying certain codes of ethics?
SMITH:
Well, let me answer the last part of it first. I usually don't bother with persons who are too convinced that what they are already doing is what they ought to do. But with regard to the matter of the code being beyond our reach, it seems to me we had an illustration of this a moment ago. It was suggested that perhaps we had said that consent was not necessary. We had not said that. We had said that consent was necessary but at the same time that we are perfectly well aware of all the difficulties of saying precisely and exactly what it means. To me it makes all the difference in the world to say that consent is necessary but admittedly difficult to obtain under ideal conditions, and to say that it can be ignored because it is hard to apply. It would have to get so difficult to apply that it didn't mean anything at all for us to identify the case where it is ambiguous with the case where it doesn't make any difference. So that in a system in which consent doesn't count you get a very different kind of system from the one that presumably didn't want to operate without consent, and no amount of calling attention to the difficulty of making it precise shall take the place of that condition. Once again you have the difference between a human being who may from a chemical standpoint be worth 98 cents, but who from the standpoint of the human person (which by the way is understood by all of us in our own case) is another story.
Since consent is so hard to define, and the information necessary for "informed" consent is so difficult to provide, would you like to change the system to eliminate the need for consent and depend only on the conscience of the experimentors and their supervisory panel? BONDY: No, I would not. At the risk of seeming to stick my chin out for Dr. Smith's round house, I would like to say I really think that what we are doing is pretty good. We do our best to explain to the subject what we are going to do, and why we want to do it, and then we hope he will say it is all right. There are many reasons for wanting him to say that it is all right; we have talked about the important ethical and moral ones; but there also are practical ones. If the subject isn't willing -you can't use him. He won't cooperate and the experiment probably won't work. For most purposes we need not only a person who has consented, but who is cooperative and willing to go along with what we want to do. There are operational advantages to getting consent. But aside from that, I can't conceive that a person who considers himself a physician would be willing to do an experiment on a subject who did not consent. The problem we all come into is the question of how much has to be told to the subject to get him to consent; and this can be very difficult as we said repeatedly. Nevertheless, I don't think that it would be better to try to set up a system in which consent were not an important-perhaps the most important-single criterion of availability of the subject.
BEESON:
Now, I'll answer that too. I think we want consent and we want as informed consent as we can get. What we are facing here is a very troubling thing, that we as physicians, in the interest of advancing medical knowledge and improving medical care, are deliberately doing things which have some risk, slight as it may be. We would like to surround this with all of the possible precautions, and one of the things we are surrounding it with is this discussion. This is a good thing to make us face this issue squarely and make us think about it. But certainly the consent business seems to me to be one of the prime things to be attained. I know it can't be obtained properly by working with children or with mental defectives, and that many of our adult subjects because of disease or their mentalities are hardly capable of giving proper consent, but we must do everything we can to come close to doing this perfectly.
Thank you all very much for coming, and thanks especially to Professor Smith and Professor Donnelly for helping us to think about a deeply troubling subject.
